It’s an unspoken assumption of mainstream political commentary in the US and UK that ‘we’ mean well. We might be naïve, idealistic, bungling, or occasionally foolish but, a few rotten apples aside, the ‘we’ nations are fundamentally benign. Official enemies, on the other hand, are always up to something, have selfish, ulterior motives and are generally bad eggs.
These two assumptions frame intellectual and media debate. When ‘enemy’ states act, such as Russia in Syria, their public statements are evaluated according to their actions and their blandishments about freedom, democracy, self-defence, and bringing stability are not taken at face value. Strategic interests are evaluated and motives deduced. This is as it should be. When the US and UK ‘intervene’ the blandishments are taken at face value, strategic interests are absent (or couched in simple terms of defence) and our actions are interpreted and, if necessary, sifted to fit with the blandishments. Words are the sole prerequisite for demonstrating intent. Imagine for a moment a BBC journalist reporting that the British or American government’s real motive in a given conflict was to exacerbate it for selfish reasons. It’s almost inconceivable. We are assumed always to desire peace and stability and toseek strenuously to avoid conflict.
I’d like to illustrate the falsity of this assumption with a handful of examples of Anglo-American interventions in the past thirty years: Iraq in 1990, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq (again) in 2002, and North Korea today. I hope these examples will demonstrate that the US and its lackey, far from being in pursuit of peace, often make strenuous attempts to avoid it.
On 2nd August 1990, long-standing US and UK ally, Saddam Hussein, ordered Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Within two days Iraq had fully annexed the small country and the world was in uproar. When Saddam realised his miscalculation, that the US would not permit the annexation, he made several attempts at a negotiated withdrawal. Ten days after the invasion, he proposed a settlement linking Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to withdrawals from other illegally occupied Arab lands: Syria from Lebanon and Israel from the territories it conquered in 1967. As the New York Times reported,
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq suggested that he might withdraw his forces from Kuwait if Israel first withdrew from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and if Syria pulled its soldiers out of Lebanon. Washington and Israel dismissed such a deal.
A few days later Iraq made another offer, described by one official who specialised in Middle East affairs as ‘serious’ and ‘negotiable’, to withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to return in exchange for sanctions being lifted, guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf, and sole control of the Rumailah oil field, which extends two miles under Kuwait. Significantly, it made no mention of the previous precondition that the US pull its troops out of Saudi Arabia. The proposal again received little response.
In December that year, Iraq made another proposal to exit Kuwait in exchange for a US commitment not to attack its soldiers as they withdrew. They also asked for foreign troops to leave the region, for an agreement on the Palestinian issue, and a ban on all WMD in the region (a goal formally adopted a year later in Security Council Resolution 687). US officials described the offer as ‘interesting’ and signalling ‘Iraqi interest in a negotiated settlement.’ A State Department Mideast expert described the proposal as a ‘serious prenegotiation position.’ The demand for an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories was dropped and it was made clear that a deal over Palestine was not a precondition for Iraq’s withdrawal. The White House, as Newsday reported, ‘immediately dismissed the proposal’.
Were the offers genuine? Was it justifiable to give Iraq any sort of concession for withdrawing? We’ll never have an answer to the first question but, for the second, it seems clear that while Saddam was looking for a way to withdraw while saving face, the US appeared bent on backing him into a corner. One might argue that invaders should not be negotiated with, that they should never gain one iota from their criminality but that was not the US (or Israeli) position, then or now.
Iraq’s peaceful withdrawal might well have happened without a further shot being fired. It seems, however, that the US Government was intent on making war happen, presumably seeing the crisis as an opportunity to consolidate its hold on the region. Why else did Pentagon officials claim, in an allegation later disproved but never retracted, that satellite images (which were never provided) showed Iraq had massed 250,000 troops and 1,500 tanks on the Saudi border? A diplomatic solution, particularly with UN involvement, would have undercut US prestige and delegitimised future US military interventionism. Instead rejectionism and falsification to fight peace.
In 1999, at the Rambouillet Conference, the US again acted to forestall the possibility of a peaceful resolution; this time to the Kosovo War. It did so by adding conditions to the text of the proposed Rambouillet Agreement that were calculated to be unacceptable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Annex B of the proposed ‘peace treaty’ included a Status of Forces Agreement, which required that NATO forces ‘under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties’ [i.e. FRY], jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’ and would ‘enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters.’ Note that this applied not merely to Kosovo but that NATO was demanding absolute, unfettered reign in the entirety of the FRY.
In other extraordinary provisions, NATO insisted that ‘the economy of Kosovo shall function on free market principles’ and that state assets be privatised. No less extraordinary, when this was reported by the Australian journalist, John Pilger, the Guardian’s diplomatic Editor, Ian Black, went so far as to flatly deny that this first passage existed at all. The reader may verify this for themselves. As Michael Parenti put it, the ‘agreement’ was not an agreement at all but an ‘ultimatum for unconditional surrender’. This was conceded later by the second most senior British defence minister during the conflict, Lord Gilbert, in testimony to Parliament:
I think certain people were spoiling for a fight in NATO at that time. I think the terms put to Milosevic at Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable: how could he possibly accept them? It was quite deliberate.
Henry Kissinger – never one to let a war go unmongered – judged that the Rambouillet text was ‘a provocation, an excuse to start bombing,’ while James Rubin (then Assistant US Secretary of State for Public Affairs) conceded in 2000 that the US’s ‘internal goal was not to get a peace agreement at Rambouillet.’ The combination of the unacceptable demands of access and immunity coupled with the remarkable inclusion, in a supposed peace treaty, of US demands about how the Kosovan economy was to operate, is perhaps best explained by John Norris, former communications director for the then US deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott:
It was Yugoslavia’s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform – not the plight of the Kosovar Albanians – that best explains NATO’s war.
The US justified their invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 on the grounds that the Taliban had refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, whom they suspected of involvement in the September 11th atrocity. Yet in fact the Taliban made several offers to extradite bin Laden; their mistake was to ask the US to provide evidence. The Independent reported at the time,
[Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Haji Abdul Kabir] said: “If America were to step back from the current policy, then we could negotiate.” Mr bin Laden could be handed over to a third country for trial, he said. “We could discuss which third country.”
But… Washington rejected the Taliban offer out of hand. “When I said no negotiations I meant no negotiations,” Mr Bush said. “We know he’s guilty. Turn him over. There’s no need to discuss innocence or guilt.”
In fact, the US had demanded bin Laden’s extradition for several years but had always refused to provide evidence -generally held to be a normal component of an extradition request. The offers culminated in a proposal in October 2001, reported by the Daily Telegraph, when a delegation from Pakistan, led by Qazi Hussain Ahmadn (leader of Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami party) went to Afghanistan to negotiate with the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar:
Omar agreed that bin Laden should be taken to Pakistan, where he would be held under house arrest in Peshawar. The proposal, which had bin Laden’s approval, was that within the framework of Islamic shar’ia law evidence of his alleged involvement in the American attacks would be placed before an international tribunal.
The court would decide whether to try him on the spot or hand him over to America.
This deal was reportedly blocked by the then dictator of Pakistan (and off-and-on US client) General Pervez Musharraf. One doesn’t need to read between the lines much:
Gen Musharraf and Wendy Chamberlain, America’s ambassador to Pakistan, were told of the mission in advance and yesterday Qazi met the Pakistani president to relay the proposal.
“He was told that, while he backed the idea, the stumbling block was that he could not guarantee bin Laden’s safety”…’.
Could the Taliban have been trusted? Would they have handed bin Laden over? We can’t know for certain because the avenue was closed off. Even if one does accept (and I do not) the proposition that it is acceptable to bomb a country when its government refuses to hand over a suspect, it is even more outlandish to suggest that no evidence need be laid as part of a strenuous effort to avoid violence. The US made no such effort. As with Iraq in 2003, war was not ‘the last resort’.
I won’t unearth the complex tale of US and UK machinations that led in 2003 to our second major attack on Iraq. The inspections were a failed attempt to give the imprimatur of due process to a calculated act of aggression, betrayed by the obvious frustration shown by US and UK officials every time inspectors failed to find any proscribed weapons. Nor is there space to discuss in detail Iraq’s last minute, desperate offers to avert an invasion, which included allowing in thousands of US troops to look for weapons and an offer to hold internationally-monitored elections. It’s enough to draw attention to three matters to further illustrate my argument.
Firstly, during 2002 – before the invasion-proper – the US and UK intensified their decade-long bombing of Iraq, in order to ‘put pressure on the regime’ and provoke the Iraqi government into action that would justify war. Regime change being a crime in international law it was necessary to do something that would ‘create the conditions in which [Britain] could legally support military action.’ 
Secondly, in March 2003, as a supposed compromise, the British attack dog proposed six requirements that Iraq would have to satisfy in order to avert war. One was to commit to ‘surrender all mobile bio-production laboratories for destruction’ – a demand with which Iraq could never have complied because it never had any. Another demand, which was either inexcusably inept or monstrously cynical was,
A public statement by Saddam Hussein, broadcast in Iraq, admitting possession of weapons of mass destruction, stating his regime has decided to give them up and pledging to cooperate with UN weapon inspectors.
Of course, there are some who say that the invasion was never about WMD (they are correct) but instead was about removing Saddam Hussein (they are wrong). On the eve of the invasion the BBC reported,
President George W Bush’s spokesman, Ari Fleischer, said allied troops were going to enter Iraq “no matter what”.
“If Saddam were to leave, American forces, coalition forces, would still enter Iraq – hopefully they would then be able to enter peacefully because the Iraqi army would not have been given orders to fire on them, and then they could carry out the disarmament of Iraq,”
Iraq was to be invaded one way or another. If a direct casus belli could not be manufactured through bombing then one of several pretexts would do. And obviously cynical attempts at ‘compromise’ -with demands so unreasonable only trained journalists could take them seriously – would be used to provide a veneer of reasonability.
Fast forward to today and the US is threatening North Korea and demanding an end to its nuclear programme but refusing to explore what might be the most straightforward route to achieving this: to accept North Korea’s offer to freeze its nuclear programme. As the New York Times reported only in June,
The Trump administration has come under growing pressure to open negotiations on a temporary freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests in return for reducing the American military footprint in the Korean Peninsula, according to American officials and foreign diplomats.
Versions of the proposal, floated by Beijing for several months… But White House officials say they are not interested in any proposal that would require the United States to lift military or economic pressure on the North, even in return for a moratorium on tests.
A similar offer, made to the Obama Administration in 2016, was rebuffed on the grounds that it was insincere; the North Koreans would ‘have to do better than that.’
The relationship between the US and N. Korea has always been riddled with mistrust and the latter’s record of compliance has been far from spotless. As Robert Carlin and John W Lewis noted in 2007, the underlying perception in the US has long been, ‘you can’t deal with them’. Yet, as they observed, this neglects a long history of cooperation. ‘Forgotten in the reality that from 1993 to 2000, the U. S. Government had twenty or more issues under discussion with the DPRK in a wide variety of settings. A large percentage of those talks ended in agreements or made substantial progress.’
Yet, on occasions when an agreement has been reached, the US has done something to blow it and the media has compliantly blamed DPRK. Significant progress in denuclearizing N. Korea had been made by 2005 when the incoming Bush Administration wrecked the deal. As Bruce Cumings recorded in Le Monde Diplomatique,
On September 19, 2005, the United States and the DPRK agreed on certain principles leading to denuclearization, including the US commitment not to attack North Korea. Three days later, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the DPRK, which it accused of engaging in illegal activities with Banco Delta Asia in Macau, China, Cutting the country from the international financial system. It is now known that very few incriminating evidence was included in the US Treasury file, which was intended to torpedo the September negotiations.
There’s a recurring patter to the US and UK’s ‘search for peace’ in the world. Arrogant ultimatums, a refusal to compromise, unreasonable demands calculated to be rejected, and attempts to manufacture justifications. All the while, instead of benevolence, a cynical opportunism that sees every crisis as an opportunity to extend and entrench power. In each case, the only peace sought is that found while strolling through a graveyard of one’s enemies.
 Editorial, “The issue is still Kuwait,” Financial Times (London), August 13, 1990, p. 12
 Michael R. Gordon “Confrontation in the Gulf; Bush orders navy to halt all shipments of Iraq’s oil and almost all its imports,” New York Times 13th August 1990 available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/13/world/confrontation-gulf-bush-orders-navy-halt-all-shipments-iraq-s-oil-almost-all-its.html?pagewanted=all
 Knut Royce “Middle East Crisis Secret Offer Iraq Sent Pullout Deal to U.S.; [ALL EDITIONS]” Newsday 29th August 1990, archived copy available at https://www.scribd.com/document/38969813/MIDDLE-EAST-CRISIS-Secret-Offer-Iraq-Sent-Pullout-Deal-to-U-S-ALL-EDITIONS
 Knut Royce “Iraq Offers Deal to Quit Kuwait U.S. rejects it, but stays `interested’” 3rd January 1991, archived copy available at https://www.scribd.com/document/38969954/Iraq-Offers-Deal-to-Quit-Kuwait-U-S-rejects-it-but-stays-interested-NASSAU-AND-SUFFOLK-Edition See also PATRICK E. TYLER “Confrontation in the Gulf; Arafat Eases Stand on Kuwait-Palestine Link,” New York Times 3rd January 1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/03/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-arafat-eases-stand-on-kuwait-palestine-link.html
 Scott Peterson “In war, some facts less factual,” Christian Science Monitor 6th September 2002. See also John MacArthur (1992) “Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War,” pp. 173.
 See “Text of Military Annex to Draft Rambouillet Accords” paras. 6a,b,c, 8 and 9 available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/34726.htm
 In fact, the text does contain a qualified promise to abide by FRY law in para. 2, which states that ‘…all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain from activities not compatible with the nature of the Operation.’ However, since the clause begins by stating that this is ‘without prejudice to their privileges and immunities under this Appendix,’ the promise is almost meaningless.
 Ian Black rubbished Pilger’s claims, stating: “In an earlier version of his thesis, billed without irony as ‘amazing’ in last week’s New Statesman, Pilger provided more detail. He quoted (correctly) from section 11 of appendix B, about NATO’s use of airports, roads, rails and ports. Inexplicably, he then added the sentence: ‘The economy shall function in accordance with free market principles.’
“Damning stuff that. Proof that Nato really is the military arm of unreconstructed international vampire capitalism. But that sentence does not exist.” (Ian Black “Bad News” Guardian 19th May 1999, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/may/19/balkans9 emphasis mine)
 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990123_RambouilletAccord.pdf The relevant passage is Chapter 4, paragraph 1 on page 46.
 Michael Parenti (2002) “To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia” p. 112.
 Gilbert quoted in Patrick Wintour “War Strategy Ridiculed” Guardian, 21st July 2000 available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jul/21/balkans1
 Henry Kissinger quoted in Ian Bancroft “Serbia’s anniversary is a timely reminder” Guardian 24th March 2009, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo ; James Rubin on the Charlie Rose Show 18th April 2000, transcript and video available at https://charlierose.com/videos/28943
 John Norris ( 2005) “Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo” p. xxiii. As this is a central contention of the book for which Talbot himself wrote the foreward, I think it’s reasonable to assume it has Talbot’s support.
 Andrew Buncombe “Bush rejects Taliban offer to surrender bin Laden,” Independent 14th October 2001 available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bush-rejects-taliban-offer-to-surrender-bin-laden-9143208.html
 Patrick Bishop “Pakistan blocks bin Laden trial,” Daily Telegraph 4th October 2001 available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1358464/Pakistan-blocks-bin-Laden-trial.html
 Sir John Chilcot’s damning conclusion at the end of his inquiry was that ‘the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort.’ http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement/
 Julian Borger, Brian Whitaker and Vikram Dodd “Saddam’s desperate offers to stave off war” Guardian 7th November 2003, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/07/iraq.brianwhitaker
 Michael Smith “The War Before the War” New Statesman 30th May 2005 available at http://www.newstatesman.com/node/195307 Smith article quotes the infamous ‘Downing Street Memo,’ written by civil servant Matthew Rycroft in July 2002, which was minutes of a meeting of senior British government, defence and intelligence personnel including the head of MI6. The full text can be read here: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/II-Doc14.pdf
 Staff and Agencies “Straw spells out key tests for Saddam,” Guardian 12th March 2003 available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/12/iraq.uk1 1
 BBC News “Saddam rejects Bush ultimatum” 18th March 2003, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2861029.stm
 David E. Sanger and Gardiner Harris “U.S. Pressed to Pursue Deal to Freeze North Korea Missile Tests,” New York Times 21st June 2017 available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/world/asia/north-korea-missle-tests.html
 Associated Press “Obama rejects North Korea’s nuclear offer: ‘You’ll have to do better than that’” Guardian 24th April 2016 available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/24/obama-response-north-korea-nuclear-tests-deal
 Robert Carlin and John W Lewis (2008) “Negotiating with North Korea 1992-2007” available at http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Negotiating_with_North_Korea_1992-2007.pdf
 Bruce Cumings “Et la Corée du Nord redevint fréquentable” Le Monde Diplomate October 2007, available at https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/10/CUMINGS/15210 I have relied on Google Translate for the English version.